Chapter Summary Of The Philosophy Of Freedom
Eric Cunningham
Chapter 13 The Value of Life (Pessimism and Optimism)
In this chapter, Steiner reflects on the philosophical debate between optimism, summed up as the belief that "the world is the best imaginable (193)," and pessimism, summed up as the belief that"life is full of agony and misery, that pain everywhere outweighs pleasure, and suffering everywhere joy (193)."
He distinquishes between the pessimistic philosophies of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, both of whom had large followings in the nineteenth century. Schopenhauer, argued that existence was dominated by an impersonal Will, striving for unattainable satisfaction in a world full of suffering. The thinking person, accepting this chooses not to waste energy striving for fleeting satisfaction and will work to suppress that desire which only leads to pain.
Hartmann's pessimism, on the other hand, is rooted in the supposition that the pain and suffering of the world is the pain and suffering of God, and that God seeks relief from cosmic suffering through the creation of the world and humanity. On the cosmic pain-pleasure "balance sheet," pain always outweighs pleasure. The goal of God, thus, is the eradication of divine pain--human beings can assist in bringing this about by accepting the reality that life is suffering, and opt not to seek personal satisfaction, but take up the ethical project of delivering the world (and God) from its pain. All pleasure is ultimately an illusion, says Hartmann, so the mature person, ethically chooses to renounce selfish desire for the sake of the universal good.
Steiner had big problems with both of these pessimisms, and forcefully validated the correctness of human striving. Arguing that striving for satisfaction, honor, and high ideals was a source of joy, he repudiated both Schopenhauer's call for "universal laziness," and Hartmann's call to act ethically in a world in which there were no real rewards for doing so. Neither of these pessimistic schools, Steiner argued, were rooted in real human experience.
Striving for Gratification
According to Steiner, striving is integral to the human experience. Striving after a desire is not the source of pain, but a great source of pleasure. Failure to attain the thing we strive for may cause pain, but not the pursuit. Thus, Steiner says, Schopenhauer is wrong to equate human desire with pain. Should a person be devoid of of desire, (and thus "liberated" in the Buddhist sense) he or she will suffer boredom, which is a greater source of misery than striving. This is a very important consideration when it comes to figuring out what the balance of pleasure and pain may be in any life.
Pleasure and Pain
Steiner calls attention to the conventional philosophical arguments (in particular those of Eduard von Hartmann) that treat the positions of optimism and pessimism as being dependent on some kind of measurement of the quantity of pain or pleasure that exists in the world. The pessimistic philosopher believes that a sober look at reality will yield that there is more pain than pleasure. As Hartmann observes, this can only be a subjective judgment, based on experience, and never really an "algebraic" equation. A clear thinker, then, should make an attempt to bracket out his or her "feelings" in order to arrive at an objective assessment of the value of life.
We need (says Hartmann) to:
1) admit that our will distorts our ability to analyze the quality of feeling--we also have to
2) recognize that the things about which we have feelings of pleasure are only illusions
--our rational intellect, properly functioning will help us see through these illusions, because rationally, we have to admit (says Hartmann) that all pleasure leads ultimately to suffering. (Recall that Hartmann espoused a kind of heroic pessimism in which human beings were the vessels of God's own pain).
Steiner challenges von Hartmann's position, saying that feelings of pleasure are not based upon illusory objects. The feelings themselves are the objects of pleasure--to try to rationally assess whether or not a feeling can be a valid form of pleasure creates room for philosophical error. If for example, we rationally conclude that there is a surplus of pain in the world, and yet somehow we experience pleasure (however illusory), and don't decide to commit suicide to escape the world of pain, we need to question our own conclusions. If the goal of helping to expiate God's pain is a noble one--a good reason for living--then shouldn't the pursuit of that goal be a source of pleasure?
"The pessimism of Eduard von Hartmann comes in a very peculiar manner to the point of declaring life worthless, because pain predominates in it, but of maintaining, nevertheless the necessity of undergoing it (206)."
Desire as the yardstick
Eduard von Hartmann's argument, Steiner tells us, depends on thinking that moral ideals somehow emerge in the void where pessimism realizes that striving for satisfaction is useless. After we realize that striving for pleasure will bring only pain, we submit heroically to the task of helping to alleviate the cosmic suffering of God. As noted earlier, Steiner has a difficult time with this logic, using the example of a merchant who continues to stay in business even after his bookkeeper has shown him that he is operating at a deficit--in other words, if the human being operates at constant deficit of pleasure (one way of stating the pessimist's argument that pain outweighs pleasure), then the human being is living a kind of philosophically bankrupt life. A rational person is supposed to value pleasure over pain, but realizes that pain is the only reality--what then brings pleasure? If we take pleasure in absorbing divine pain, then it can't really be pain. It would seem that the only really rational thing to do is commit suicide, because the rational conclusion is that pleasure is either a) illusory, or b) simply impossible to attain. But if we commit suicide, we would not be fulfilling the purpose for which we are created, which is to bear God's pain. The whole argument, as Steiner points out, has several holes in it.
The problem, Steiner suggests, comes from using pleasure as "yardstick" of the value of life. As long as we evaluate life experience in terms of "units" of pleasure, we're not understanding the value of life properly.
Desire, not pleasure, Steiner says, is a better yardstick for measuring the value of life.
"Pleasure is measured against the needs of life. Our desires are the yardstick; pleasure is what is measured (211)."
More on willing and desire
Steiner elaborates on the assertion that desire, rather than mere pleasure is the proper "yardstick" for measuring the value of life. Satisfaction can be considered attained when desire felt and pleasure experienced are evenly matched. If pleasure falls short of the quantity of desire, we are still left wanting, and when pleasure exceeds desire, that pleasure becomes pain--as in the case of a hangover, or stomach-ache. The very presence of desire suggests that the pessimist's assessment of life as value-less is misconceived from the start. We desire specific things, which gives us pleasure in anticipation, pleasure in pursuit, and pleasure in attainment. Even the failure to attain the desire cannot diminish the pleasure that was felt in desires attained in the past. Moreover the presence of pain that must be overcome can add to the pleasure of attainment. There is no thing we can call general pleasure--pleasure is specific to the desire to which it adheres, thus to try to come up with an abstract balance sheet of pleasure and pain makes no sense--or, as Steiner would say, it doesn't conform to life as it is experienced. The pleasure gained from taking a walk is not the same as the pleasure of eating a meal.
Steiner concludes that willing, based on desire, is so fundamental to human experience that humans will strive to attain their desires in defiance of suffering and pain. We accept the bad parts of life as long as there is value in life to be had.
"Even if pessimism were right in its assertion that more pain than pleasure is present in the world, this would have no influence on our willing, for in spite of this, living creatures strive for whatever pleasure is left (216)."
The failure of pessimism to understand moral striving
In the remainder of Chapter thirteen, Steiner demonstrates that pessimist philosophy does not properly treat the problem of ethics and moral striving, and says, again, that the reason for this failure is the false attempt to come up with a "balance sheet" for pleasure and pain.
We don't merely strive for "pleasure" or "happiness" as ends in themselves. We enjoy the pleasure and happiness that comes as a by-product from willfully acting on our desire to attain appropriate goods. Accordingly, the pessimist idea that we take up the duties of life only after we learn that life is futile, and thus stoically resign ourselves to the task of alleviating divine pain, is all wrong.
We seek the good for its sake, and gain pleasure thereby.
"Morality lies in striving for a goal that one recognizes as justified; it lies in man's being to pursue this goal, as long as the pain connected with it does not lame the desire for it. . . this is the nature of all real willing (219)."
Moral greatness is also linked to the function of willing.
"Whoever strives after ideals of noble greatness," Steiner writes, "does so because they are the content of their being, and realizing them will be an enjoyment for him compared to which the pleasure that pettiness draws from satisfying commonplace things is trifling (220)."
Moral freedom
Steiner finishes this chapter with a very nice return to the question of morality and freedom, concluding ultimately that a pessimist philosophy would negate moral freedom.
"Whoever wants to eradicate the pleasure of satisfying human desires must first make the human being into a slave who does not act because he wants to, but only because he ought (220)."
With this statement, Steiner seems to deflate Hartmann's notion that we must stop striving in order to live morally, thereby easing divine pain. To do so, Steiner implies, would be a capitulation to necessity rather than a free act.
"The ethics which builds upon pessimism springs from a disregard of moral imagination (220)."
A fully developed person, Steiner believes, will not spend his or her life merely seeking pleasure, and will endure pain freely (not under compulsion or out of failure) for the sake of pursuing a higher, self-generated ideal. In the final analysis, a mature developed person will acquire the moral qualities capable of determining what the "value of life" is, and doesn't need to be concerned with the fruitless task of measuring pleasure against pain.
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